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A PRIMER ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SOME
DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Michael C. Blumm*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Modem environmental law is only a generation old. Just twentytwo years ago, President Nixon began the modem era by signing into
law the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Prior to the
signing of NEPA, there was no effective national environmental legislation in the United States. Prompted by exposes such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring2 and the Ralph Nader studies on air and water
pollution, 3 Congress enacted a rapid succession of legislative initiatives in the 1970s.4 By 1980, the United States had virtually all of its
major environmental statutes in place. The last fifteen years have
largely been years of implementation and fine-tuning, 5 not years of
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. This essay grew out of a series of talks
given at the Universities of Athens and Thrace and at the American Center in Thessaloniki
while the author was Fulbright Professor during the fall of 1991. A slightly different version of
this article will be published in Greek by the University of Athens Law Review. For help with
the footnotes, the author thanks Michael Cadigan and Barry Needleman, members of the class
of 1992 at Lewis and Clark Law School.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1991).
2 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962) (a report on the impact of pesticides on humans and
the environment).
3 John C. Esposito & Ralph Nader, Vanishing Air: The Ralph Nader Study Group on Air
Pollution (1970) (a study of air pollution control legislation and the now-defunct National Air
Pollution Control Administration); David Zwick, Marcy Benstock & Ralph Nader, Water
Wasteland: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution (1971) (a study of the
workings of the Federal Water Quality Administration, now the Water Quality Office of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
4 See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970-71)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (1991)) (the 1970 Amendments substantially revised the prior legislation and are the basis of the current Clean Air Act (CAA));
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)) (substantially revising
the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965), the 1972 legislation is
the basis of today's Clean Water Act (CWA)); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TCSA),
Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671
(1991)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1991)); and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1991)).
5 For example, the CAA was amended in 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), and
in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990); the CWA was amended in 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), and is currently due for reauthorization; RCRA was
amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98
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creation. That might soon change, however, as we reach the limits of
what the first generation of environmental law can reasonably
produce.
This essay will introduce and discuss a number of characteristics of
modem American environmental law, including the process for
assessing environmental impact, the legislation for pollution control
and the program of environmental cleanup. I will also mention, but
not discuss in detail, a number of other environmental initiatives concerning chemical regulation, area-wide protection and species preservation. Finally, the essay will discuss the direction in which
American environmental policy is heading and conclude with some
personal hopes about the course that direction might take.
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The centerpiece of U.S. environmental law is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a statute that gives the federal government both the authority and the means to obtain information
necessary to protect the environment. 6 NEPA makes environmental
protection the mandate of all federal agencies.7 It also requires agencies to evaluate the environmental consequences of their proposals
and to consider alternative ways of proceeding.8 NEPA requires that
agencies prepare environmental impact statements for those activities
with potentially "significant" environmental effects and environmental assessments for those activities with potentially less than "significant" environmental effects.' Perhaps just as importantly, NEPA
requires that other federal, state and local agencies and the public be
given the opportunity to comment on federal proposals.' 0 The federal
agency advancing the proposal must then provide a meaningful
response to those comments.I
Stat. 3221 (1984); TSCA was amended in 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 100 Stat. 2970 (1986); and
CERCLA was amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
6 See generally Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The Past, Present and Future of the
National EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 20 Envtl. L. 447-810 (1990) (a comprehensive analysis of
the history, future and present status of NEPA); Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer, 19 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,060 (Feb. 1989) (outlining NEPA's purpose, scope and implementation procedures, and describing current issues in NEPA policy).
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1991).
8 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
9 Id. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502 (1991) (environmental impact statements), 1508.9
(environmental assessments), 1508.27 (definition of "significantly").
1042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
II See also Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The
Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 277 (1990).
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NEPA, however, contains no express enforcement mechanism.
Although the statute could be construed as merely a statement of
good intentions on the part of the federal government, the federal
courts treat it more seriously. They have enforced NEPA's lofty rhetoric by enjoining administrative agency actions that were unsubstantiated by documentation that both considers the environmental effects
2
of agency proposals and evaluates reasonably available alternatives.1
The courts have, however, ruled that NEPA does not forbid actions
that do not produce the best environmental result.13
NEPA, it turns out, demands only informed decision making, not
particular results. NEPA assumes that good decisions will flow from
good environmental information, but the statute does not elevate environmental protection over other legitimate national policies. The
nation's environmental policy requires only equal consideration of
environmental protection and the opportunity for public and interagency involvement in all federal decision making affecting the
environment. 14

Despite the fact that NEPA does not demand environmental
improvement, the statute has nevertheless revolutionized federal decision making by requiring public involvement, interagency coordination and written explanations of the environmental effects of and
reasonable alternatives to agency proposals. NEPA, in important
respects, has democratized federal administrative law. In addition, it
has produced quite a bit of environmental improvement. For example, many agencies have been discouraged from pursuing environmentally destructive proposals because of their responsibility to disclose
publicly and respond to the likely effects of their activities. 5 Further,
the courts, armed with NEPA, have shown themselves capable of
enjoining agency activities that are accompanied by self-serving or
12See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (NEPA requires a presentation of the environmental risks incident to reasonable alternative courses of action); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NEPA § 102 creates judicially enforceable
duties).
13 Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (once an
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, a court's only role is

to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)

(NEPA's mandate is essentially procedural).
14 42 U.S.C. § 4332. See also Stryker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227-28; Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 557-58.
15See Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement
Strategy of Administrative Reform (1984); Richard A. Liroff, NEPA: Where Have We Been
and Where Are We Going?, 46 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 154 (1980).
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dishonest statements regarding the likely environmental effects of federal activities.' 6 For these reasons, although NEPA is not a panacea
for environmental protection, it has inspired a number of imitatorsat the state level,' 7 in other countries" and in areas unrelated to the
environment. 19
NEPA imitators in other countries will not likely rely as heavily
upon the judiciary as in the United States.2 ° In some respects, not
relying on the courts might prove beneficial, given that United States
courts have been reluctant to enjoin agency activities for violations of
NEPA. 2' Nevertheless, in the absence of an independent review of
governmental activities, the effectiveness of environmental assessment
laws in countries that do not recognize judicial review will remain
suspect.

III.

POLLUTION CONTROL

The United States has a number of statutes aimed at disposing of
hazardous waste on land and controlling toxic emissions into the air
and water.22 Unlike NEPA, which enlists all federal agencies in its
effort to promote environmental decision making, the pollution control laws give the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the state equivalents sole authority to administer and
enforce their provisions. 23 The basic formula requires EPA to. set
16See, e.g., California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 772 (9th Cir. 1982) (where proposed agency
action differed significantly from alternatives canvassed in draft environmental impact statement, agency required to circulate a draft supplement for public comment).
17 See, e.g., New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. Envtl. Conservation
Law §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1992).
18 See, e.g., Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects
on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L175) 40; Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental
Quality: Twentieth Annual Report 43-46 (1990); Constance D. Hunt, A Note on Environmental Impact Assessment in Canada,20 Envtl. L. 789 (1990); Nigel High, Environmental Assessment - The EC Directive, 1987 J. Plan. & Env't L. 4.
19 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988) (regulatory impact statements); Exec. Order No. 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1988),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (family impact statements); Exec. Order No.
12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (taking of property
impact statements).
20 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 18, at 790-93 (1990) (describing Canadian environmental
impact assessment requirements and the effect that recent judicial developments have had on
the requirements).
21 See Michael C. Blumm, NEPA At Twenty: A Preface, 20 Envtl. L. 447, 450-54 (1990)
(describing changes in NEPA during the twenty years following its enactment).
22 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); CAA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q); CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
23 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(C), 9604; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928; CAA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b).
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standards governing the issuance of permits.24 These permits may be
issued by either EPA or the states25 and are enforced by both EPA
and the states, regardless of which entity issued the permit.26
Three basic types of standards are common to federal environmental law: (1) ambient standards, which are set on the basis of total
concentration levels; 27 (2) emission standards, which specify the precise amount of pollution that can come from a particular source28 and
(3) workplace standards, which prescribe certain equipment or operations when it is not practical to set emission standards. 29 Although
30
ambient standards are most noticeable in the Clean Air Act (CAA),
they are also becoming more prominent in the Clean Water Act
(CWA). 3' Ambient standards are used by dividing the air or water
into clean and dirty areas, and then requiring increasingly intensified
cleanup of the more polluted areas.12 The use of ambient standards is
hampered by poor monitoring devices, a deficiency which makes it
difficult to know when the standard is being violated,3 3 and from inadequate scientific information, a deficiency which makes it difficult to
set concentration levels accurately.
Emissions standards, because they are tied to particular sources of
24 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(a); Ocean Dumping Act (ODA), 33 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (1988); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(b)(3) (1988).
25 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a)(b); ODA, 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1254; SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(a).
26 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i); CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342(i); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6928-29; ODA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415; SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252(3), 1253(a)(4); SDWA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300h-l, 300h-2.
27 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(c); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
28 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7521; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b).
29 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(h); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k).
30 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)).
31 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313 (state water quality standards), 1314(l)(i) (individual control strategies
for toxic pollutants).
32 The CAA incorporates a seven-level hierarchy of attainment levels. The first two levels,
named PSD Class I and Class II, are prevention of significant deterioration areas in which
NAAQS have been met. The next five - entitled marginal, moderate, serious, severe and
extreme - are areas in which actual levels of attainment diverge (by increasing degree) from
NAAQS. Requirements for these five levels become increasingly and cumulatively stringent.
The program begins with inventory requirements and maintenance and inspection programs
for motor vehicles in marginal areas, then builds up through "offset measures," clean fuel
requirements and transportation plans in "dirtier" areas. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472 (PSD
areas), 7511-751 1(a) (non-attainment areas). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d) (areas with insufficient water pollution controls must implement maximum discharge levels and can only revise
discharge permits under specified circumstances).
33 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (upholding EPA's determination
that a new discharge in an upstream state would not produce a detectable violation of the
downstream state's water quality standards).
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pollution, are much easier to enforce than ambient standards. They
are customarily established on an industry-wide basis, after study of
the industry, on the basis of the best available technology for that
industry.34 Best available technology makes cost a relevant standard
and usually distinguishes between new and existing sources by
demanding more of new sources than of existing sources.3 5 The CWA
emission standards are more comprehensive than those of the CAA,36
but both incorporate emission standards into their regulatory
regime.3 7
Workplace standards, such as the control of asbestos in the demolition or renovation of buildings,38 are imposed when other standards

prove impractical. Like emission standards, they are tailored to a particular type of industry activity3 9 and are therefore easier to enforce
than ambient standards.
The criteria for setting any of the above standards generally falls
into three categories: (1) health-based standards;' (2) technologybased standards4 and (3) cost-benefit standards.4 2 The paradigm of
public health standards are the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established under the CAA.4 3 Albeit to a lesser
extent than the CAA, the CWA also uses health-based ambient stan-

dards."

Because they are tied directly to environmental quality,

health-based standards seem to be the quintessence of environmental
34 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 306(b)(1); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7479(3) (calling for the "best
available control technology").
35 Under the CAA, new and modified major sources must comply with the lowest achievable emissions rate. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(l)-(a)(2). In contrast, existing sources need only
reduce emissions through reasonably available control technology. Id. § 7502(c)(1). The
CWA requires new sources to use the best available demonstrated control technology. 33
U.S.C. § 1316(a)-(b). Existing sources, on the other hand, must employ only the "best available technology economically achievable for such category or class." Id. § 131 l(b)(2)(A).
36 Compare CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (comprehensive emissions limitations on all point
sources in all industries) with CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 (emissions limitations on motor vehicles), 7503 (emissions limitations on major new and modified sources).
37 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316, 1317; CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412(d), 7521.
38 40 C.F.R. § 61.145 (1991).
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) ("NAAQS [must be] based... [on] allowing an
adequate margin of safety ... to protect the public health.").
41 See, e.g., id. § 7503(a)(2) ("the proposed source is required to comply with the lowest

achievable emissions rate.").
42 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) ("In establishing or revising federal standards
of performance for new sources under this section, the Administrator shall take into consideration the cost of such effluent reduction ....
43 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
- CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A) ("standards shall be such as to protect the public
health or welfare"), 1314()(!)(A) ("water quality which shall assure protection of public
health").
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standards. However, they suffer from inadequate scientific informa-

tion as to the levels of air and water pollution that actually pose a risk
to public health.45
Technology-based standards are much easier to promulgate,' and
the regulated community accepts them more readily.4 7 Because these

standards are tied to particular sources, they are also likely to yield
fairly quick results. 48 However, even if standards are set on the basis
of best available technology, 49 they are not easily revised to account
for technological improvements.5 0 In addition, what is technologically feasible for a new source may not be for an existing source.
Because the standards are not designed to produce any particular
level of environmental quality, exclusive reliance on technology-based
standards could result in high pollution concentration levels in areas
where there are numerous sources. Although all the pollution control

standards,5" the CWA relies most
regimes employ 5technology-based
2
them.
on
heavily
Cost-benefit-based standards are set, in theory, at levels that ensure
the cost of pollution not exceed its benefits.5 3 The problem is that the
45 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1059, 1062 (1981) ("Case studies in environmental regulation have shown how often bad decisions are linked to a lack of knowledge."). Cf Kirk R. Smith, Air Pollution: Assessing Total
Exposure in the United States, Env't, Oct. 31, 1988, at 15, 35 ("Knowledge gaps impair [scientific discovery] to some extent, but the biggest barriers are found in the institutional and political structure of pollution management.").
46 See S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 347-48 (1989); see also Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standardsand 'Fine Tuning'
Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267 (1985). "In sum, the original harm-based approach
for regulation of toxic water pollutants proved ineffective and has largely been replaced by
technology-based standards that are more easily implemented." Id. at 1309.
47 See Leslie F. Chard III, Comment, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Section 112
Comes of Age, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1253 (1991). "There is a broad consensus that technologybased standards should be implemented in the near future. Based on its history, the EPA
obviously prefers this type of standard, industry groups likewise favor such an approach, and
even environmentalists give it limited approval." Id. at 1262.
48 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 Ecology L. Q. 69, 75
(1988) ("when Congress rewrote the [CWA] in 1972, it abandoned reliance on water quality as
unworkable and switched instead to a set of technology-based requirements specifically constructed for quick and simple implementation").
49 See supra notes 34, 35.
50 For example, a review of nine point source categories under the CWA, which included
104 different new source performance standards, revealed that there had been no revisions to
best available technology standards between 1977 and 1991. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-417 (1991).
51 FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)-(b)(2); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a)(2)(A), 7511a(b)(2).
52 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316, 1317.
53 See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight ofHealth and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 191 (1980) (discussing the advantages
and limitations of cost-benefit analysis and how Congress and the courts structure environmental and health regulations).
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cost of pollution control is much more readily apparent than the benefits of reducing emissions. For this reason, the regulated community
has always favored cost-benefit-based standards while environmental
groups have generally opposed them.5 4 Most of the pollution control
statutes avoid cost-benefit-based standards; these standards do, how-

ever, guide the regulation of pesticides." Perhaps not surprisingly,
criticized for supplying inadequate propesticide regulation has 5been
6
tection of public health.
Environmental standards are usually applied to particular pollution
sources through permits issued either by the federal government or
the states." Enforcement of the terms contained in these permits is
the responsibility of both the federal government and the states,
regardless of who issued the permit. 8 Moreover, the public has an

important role: nearly all the pollution control statutes contain provisions for citizen suits.5 9 A hallmark of environmental law, these provisions allow citizens to sue polluters who violate the terms of their
permits, as well as the EPA and state agencies when these entities fail
to undertake mandatory activities.' If citizens prevail on the merits
of the case, they can recover attorney and expert witness fees.6 ' Thus,

use of citizen suit provisions is financially feasible for environmental
groups. Together with the public disclosure provisions in the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 62 , the citizen suit provisions of the pollution control statutes have changed forever the rela54 See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159
(1983). But cf Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21
Envtl. L. 1321, 1351-55 (1991) (suggesting that either a feasibility analysis or a "risk averse"
cost-benefit analysis would support the result in Reserve Mining Co. v.EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1975) (en banc), in which the court required Reserve Mining to eliminate discharges of
taconite tailings into Lake Superior within a reasonable time.
55 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5),
(bb) (1988).
56 William H. Rodgers, Jr., 3 Environmental Law: Pesticides and Toxic Substances 100-104
(1988).
57 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
58 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6925, 6926, 6928; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
59See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
FIFRA is an exception. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 705 F.2d 1475, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1983)
(granting environmental plaintiffs standing to challenge a FIFRA action under the Administrative Procedure Act).
60 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a).
61 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(e).
62 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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tionship between government regulators and the public.6 3
All of the pollution control statutes are premised on a system of
"command and control" regulation by which the government
promulgates general environmental standards, 6 4 particularizes them
to individual sources of pollution through permits, 65 and enforces
sanctions against violators through the imposition of civil and sometimes criminal penalties.66 There is a growing interest in ensuring
that this system is sensitive to economic realities.6 ' For example, penalties against violators are increasingly being calculated on the basis of
amounts sufficient to remove any economic incentive for noncompliance. 68 Also, especially under the CAA, there has been an attempt to
lower the cost of complying with set standards by allowing sources to
trade allowable emissions among themselves.6 9 This "emissions trading" concept is a type of marketable pollution right-a marketable
property right. The use of this right has been circumscribed by regulation and by the fact that most pollution rights are granted for limited terms, usually for no more than five years.7 0
Another means of making environmental controls more economically sensitive is the imposition of environmental taxes and fees on
emissions, which have received widespread support in the academic
literature but not in the statutes.7 This failure to incorporate taxes
and fees into the statutory framework is no doubt the consequence of
opposition from both the regulated community, which fears the
increased costs that emission fees would entail, and environmental
groups, which have distrusted emission fees as being licenses to pol63 See generally Jeffrey C. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Control Laws (1987).

64 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1316, 1317; CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409, 7410(a).
65-CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7503.
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319; CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7420, 7477, 7524, 7572.
67 See Law and Economics Symposium: New Directions in Environmental Policy, 13 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 143-356 (1988) [hereinafter Law and Economics Symposium]; Bruce A. Ackerman
& Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985).
68 See CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7420; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3); David S. Mann, Comment,
Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse
of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act? 21 Envtl. L. 175, 187 (1991); Cynthia Anne
Oppliger, Putting Recovery Back Into RCRA: An Effective Addition to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 59, 77-79 (1990).
69 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)-(c); see also id. § 7651o (providing for direct and auction sales of
allowances by Administrator).
70 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7503; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); see generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons For
Theory and Practice, 16 Ecology L.Q. 361 (1989).
71See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson et al., Environmental Improvement Through Economic
Incentives (1977); Law and Economics Symposium, supra note 67; Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 67.
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lute.72 Taxes and fees on emissions may, however, become much
more attractive in the future as the government seeks revenue to fund
its programs and as environmental groups realize that the current
generation of environmental pollution permits allow industry to pollute up to a certain limit for free, an allowance which effectively supplies no incentive to do better than the minimum standard.
A cursory look at recent developments in each of the major pollution control regimes reveals that the 1990 amendments to the CAA
(1) dramatically increased federal regulation of hazardous air pollutants,73 (2) imposed a cap on sulfur emissions causing acid rain while
enabling sources to engage in emissions trading74 and (3) required
new, tighter emission standards on automobiles and a new generation
of gasolines. 75
In the CWA, a statute which has always been associated with environmental subsidies in the form of grants to municipal treatment
facilities,76 the federal subsidies were reduced from seventy-five percent of the construction costs to fifty-five percent in 1985.11 However,
innovative technologies remain eligible for subsidies of eighty-five percent.78 Although the CWA, like the CAA,79 is giving increased atten-

tion to toxic pollutants, ° there has been no real federal attempt to
regulate what are called "nonpoint sources" of pollution.8 ' Nonpoint
72See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based EnvironmentalRegulation: A
New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 19 Ecology L.Q. 1, 20 (1991); Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental
Fate of Toxic Wastes, the Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts'and Toxic Regulation, 19 Envtl. L.
321, 342 (1988); Robin Paul Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights - The
Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 Ohio St. L.J.
163, 175 (1986).
73 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1991).
74 Id. §§ 7651-7651o.
75 Id. §§ 7521-7554 (auto emissions); §§ 7581-7590 (new fuels). No attempt was made,
however, to discourage vehicle miles traveled. Any hope of improving urban air quality, therefore, must come from improvements in tailpipe emissions. For an overview of the 1990
amendments, see generally The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: A Symposium, 21 Envtl.
L. 1549-2253 (1991).
76 See 2 William H. Rogers, Environmental Law: Air and Water § 4.23, at 330-349 (1986).
77 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(1).
78Id. § 1282(a)(2).
79 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
80 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (requiring states to submit to the EPA lists of state waters containing
toxic pollutants, determinations of specific point sources and individual control strategies
designed to reduce toxic pollutants).
81 Id. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F)-(K) (state nonpoint source plans), 1344(0(1) (allowing discharge of
dredged fill material from farming, mining or construction subject only to best management
practices). Nonpoint sources are those other than from a discrete conveyance like a pipe or a
ditch. See id. § 1362(14) (definition of "point source"). Nonpoint sources generally include
agricultural, silvacultural, mining and construction activities as well as salt water intrusion and
dam-induced water quality changes. See id. § 1314(0.
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sources, unfortunately, constitute about one half of the water pollu-

tion burden. 2
The regulation of hazardous waste facilities has been premised on
the need to protect groundwater supplies.8 3 The pertinent statute, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 4 is among the
most complex in environmental law because Congress sought to eliminate EPA discretion in the implementation of its provisions by dictating specific commands. 5 Although the statute contains provisions
controlling nonhazardous waste and recycling,86 the federal effort has
focused almost exclusively on the regulation of hazardous waste, thus
leaving nonhazardous waste control and recycling to the states. 7
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
While pollution control statutes focus on preventing and minimizing future harm, environmental cleanup under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)88 looks backwards to past disposal of waste. CERCLA, therefore, is not a typical regulatory scheme; it is actually a liability scheme
that imposes retroactive liability on all generators,. transporters, and
past and present owners of disposal facilities.8 9 These parties are liable for both the cost of cleaning up sites and any damage to natural
resources." To finance government cleanup at sites where responsible
parties cannot be located or where parties that can be located refuse
to clean up the site themselves,9" CERCLA set up a trust fund, initially authorized at $8.5 billion but reduced to $5.1 billion for 199194.92 Unlike other environmental statutes, CERCLA allows the government to recoup its expenses by bringing suit against those responsible parties it can locate. 93 Moreover, the statute imposes liability that
82
83

2 Rodgers, supra note 76, § 4.9.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(4) (1988).

Id. §§ 6901-6992k.
85 See, e.g., id. § 6924(a)(5) (example of a so-called hammer provision). See generally James
84

J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980s, 3 Yale J. on
Reg. 351 (1986).
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988) (encouraging recovery of energy and materials from
solid waste as well as resource conservation).
87 See generally Susan M. Cook, The Law of Hazardous Waste Management, Cleanup, Liability & Litigation § 1.03 (1991).
88 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
89 Id. § 9607(a).
90 Id. § 9607(a)(4), (f)(1).
91 See id. § 9604(a) (authorizing government response unless remedial action will be taken
by an owner or other responsible party).
92 Id. § 9611 (a).
93 Id. § 9612(c).
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is strict, joint and several, meaning that each responsible party is independently liable for the government's entire cleanup cost. 94 However,
those held liable may obtain contribution from other responsible parties. 95 The government also may sue responsible parties to force them
to clean up sites themselves. 96 Private cleanups, however, require
government approval and public involvement. 97 Thus far, the EPA
has identified nearly 1,100 sites which will require cleanup. 98 Some
estimate that the total number of sites will reach 30,000 before the
hazardous waste cleanup problem finally is rectified. 99 The average
cost of cleanup for each groundwater or surface site is $21-30
million.I °°
In addition to cleanup costs, parties responsible for hazardous
10
waste disposal also are liable for damages to natural resources, '
including land, fish, wildlife, air and water. Liability is measured by
the cost of restoring the resource, 10 2 and as a result, the amounts
negotiated are considerably greater than the cleanup cost of the
sites. 0 3 Despite the several avenues of liability available in CERCLA, there has been little litigation as of yet."° Suits that involve
natural resource damages due to hazardous waste disposal are certain
to be an active area of American environmental law over the next few
years.
A separate title in CERCLA, the Emergency Planning and Com94 Id. § 9607(c).
95 See U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that contribution is
appropriate if those held liable meet their burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportionment); New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1985) (although joint
and several liability is not mandatory, it should be addressed by the courts in light of the
common law).
96 See Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of
Superfund, 1985 Duke L.J. 261, 270.
97 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (1991); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8793 (1990).
98 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1991).

99 See Roger W. Findley & Daniel Farber, Cases and Materials on Environmental Law 535
(3d ed. 1991).
100 See Frederick R. Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental
Protection: Law and Policy 617 (2d ed. 1990).
10142 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1).
102 Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Congress established a distinct preference for restoration costs as the proper measure of recovery).
103 Id. at 444-45.
104 Authoritative case law is just beginning to develop in the field of natural resource damages. For a comprehensive collection of the cases, statutes, rules and literature on natural
resource damages, see Kerry E. Russel, A Research Guide to NaturalResource Damage Under
the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 26 Land & Water
L. Rev. 403 (1991).
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munity Right to Know Act,"°5 does not deal with hazardous waste
cleanup. It instead requires local communities to devise emergency
control plans to deal with potential chemical hazards.°6 The Act also
requires that community response commissions be notified of any
releases of hazardous chemicals, in order that the centers may facilitate quick responses to such releases. 0 7 In addition, all companies
using chemicals must supply state and local authorities with information about their chemical use and any chemical release into the environment.lO' Because this information is public knowledge, any citizen
can determine what chemicals are being used and by whom. t°9 The
assumption here, as in NEPA, is that making information available to
the public will decentralize oversight. This public awareness will
encourage companies to reduce their reliance on hazardous chemicals
and to recycle rather than dispose those they do use. 1°
V.

LAND AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION

Land use and wildlife regulation historically have been left largely
to the states."'I However, the federal government does own a substantial amount of land and recently enacted regulatory regimes governing particularly sensitive lands and migratory species.
Federally owned lands constitute one-third of the land area of the
United States." 2 Most lands are managed for multiple uses,' 1 3 but
10542 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (1988).
106 Id.
107 Id.

§ 11,003.
§§ 11,002(c), 11,004.
108 Id. § 11,023.
109Id. § 11,023 (g), (h). However, an owner or operator may petition the emergency
response commission to withhold disclosure of the location of specific chemicals. Id.
§ 11,044(a). In addition, specific chemical identity may be withheld if such information is a
trade secret. Id. § 11,042.
110See generally Robert F. Blomquist, The Logic and Limits of Public Information Mandates Under Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 Vt. L. Rev. 559 (1990)
(arguing that information-forcing is but the first step in a necessary process of citizen-industry
interaction and cooperation, and that realization of such a process will minimize the social
costs of releases).
I See, e.g., Thomas A. Lund, American Wildlife-Law (1980).
112 See George C. Coggins & Charles Wilkinson, Federal Land and Natural Resources Law
11 (2d ed. 1987).
113Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528, 531(a) (1988). National
forest lands are to be managed for "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife
and fish purposes." Id. § 528. ("Multiple use" is defined as "[t]he management of all the
various renewable surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people . . . and harmonious and
coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other, without impairment of
the productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the various
resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return
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national parks are set aside for the dominant use of conservation and
public enjoyment. 1 4 The United States pioneered the notion of
national parks in 1916.115 Although the public use provision of the
National Park Service Act allows for development of facilities in the
parks, 1 6 designated wilderness areas are to remain untrammeled by
man." Similarly, designated wild and scenic rivers are be left freeflowing," 8 while wildlife refuges are to be managed principally for
wildlife habitat." 9 All of these areas, along with the more numerous
120
national forests and other public lands managed for multiple use,
are federal lands.
Although the federal government has generally left the management of nonfederal lands to the states, this policy does not apply to
wetlands-swamps, bogs and marshes-which have traditionally been
filled for development purposes. 12 ' The CWA now requires a federal
permit for any substantial filling of a wetland. 122 This regulatory program has quickly become a controversial one, for it has frequently
been used to restrict a private landowner's ability to transform wetairlands into areas that can be used for housing, crop cultivation,
23
development.
shoreline
of
types
all
and
ports, harbors
or the greatest unit output."). Id. § 528(a). For a definition of "multiple use" with respect to
"public lands," see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c)
(1988) (definition is essentially the same as that with respect to the national forests).
114National Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
I's Yellowstone was reserved for park purposes in 1872, although it was not classified as a
"national park" until much later. See Coggins & Wilkinson, supra note 112, at 134, 163-64.
116 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1988) (necessary area administration including personal
health and safety emergencies); id. § 1133(d)(5) (necessary commercial services).
117Id. §§ 1131-1136.
1I'Id. §§ 1271-1287.
119Id. § 668dd.
120 Id. §§ 528-529 (national forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (other public lands). See supra
note 113. For a definition of "public lands" see id.§ 1702(e) ("The term 'public lands' means
any land and interest in land owned by the United States within the several States and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management, without
regard to how the United States acquired the ownership .... The Act includes exceptions for
lands on the Outer Continental Shelf and Indian, Aleut and Eskimo Land. Id. § 1702(e)(l)(2).
121 Over half of the nation's wetland acreage has been destroyed. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent Trends (1984). Between
300,000 to 500,000 acres continue to be destroyed each year. Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Callfor Reform, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 695, 697 n.5
(1989).
122 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
123 See case studies discussed in Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices. The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 773, 784-95, 799-813 (1989).
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The protection of certain animal species is also a federal concern.
Federal statutes forbid the killing of marine mammals, 24 require federal approval for the hunting of migratory birds, 2 5 and contain extensive provisions for the protection of endangered species.' 26 The
Endangered Species Act is the most interesting and important of the
species protection laws: It endeavors to protect not only listed species
(which can include plants), but also their habitats. For example, protection of the spotted owl's habitat in the Pacific Northwest threatens
to substantially change timber harvesting practices on the federal
lands of that region. 27 Similarly, the listing of several species of
Pacific salmon will almost certainly alter the operation of hydroelec1 28
tric dams to facilitate salmon migration.
VI.

DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Making predictions about the future is a notably hazardous
endeavor. Still, there are some perceptible directions that American
environmental law is taking. I will mention four of these directions
and then conclude with three less perceptible, but equally important
personal hopes for the future.
First, there will continue to be an increasing emphasis on enforcement in the pollution control regimes.' 29 The first two decades of
American environmental law focused largely on design and promulgation of programs. To a certain extent, this era is now over, and
greater resources are being focused at enforcing regulations that are
already in place. This emphasis will certainly continue in the near
future.
Second, American environmental law will place greater emphasis
on privatization. This development will stem from dissatisfaction
with government solutions, or at least a realization of thelimits of
government solutions. This trend has been evidenced in the citizen
suit provisions included in all of the pollution control statutes. 30
124 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407; see Michael Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (2d
ed. 1983).
125 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712; see Bean, supra note 124.
126 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1989); see Daniel J. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act: A
Guide to its Protections and Implementation (1989).
127See Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land Law, 18
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 605 (1991).
128See Michael C. Blumm and Andy Simrin, The Unraveling ofthe ParityPromise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 Envtl. L. 657, 713-24
(1991).
129See, e.g., William K. Reilly, The Future of EnvironmentalLaw, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 351,
354 (1989) (enforcement is "at the very heart . . . of our regulatory programs").
130See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Today, there is also increasing dissatisfaction with the rigidities of
"command and control" regulation, a mode of regulation which is
slow, subject to exemptions, and economically inefficient.13 ' CERCLA's liability scheme is an alternative to command and control regulation. 32 By imposing retroactive, strict joint and several liability on
a host of responsible parties, CERCLA has effectively revolutionized
hazardous waste management. For example, as a practical matter,
one cannot sell commercial real estate in the United States any longer
without an environmental audit. 3 3 Buyers insist upon audits to protect themselves from purchasing hazardous wastes sites because they
may effectively be purchasing environmental liability. 34 Thus, a
whole new industry is now concerned with uncovering hazardous
waste problems, an industry that is not part of the government sector
and thus costs the public no tax dollars. Similarly, because of the risk
faced by its policyholders, the insurance industry has taken an active
interest in the operations of manufacturing plants that deal with hazardous chemicals. 3 5 Again, the insurer's interest costs no public tax
dollars, and yet will certainly induce changes in behavior.
A third trend involves the use of economic incentives. Certainly,
the increased cost of handling hazardous waste has encouraged a
reduction in the production of chemicals that generate those
wastes.' 36 As costs proliferate, industries will have economic incentives to use fewer toxic chemicals where there are available nontoxic
alternatives. Where there are no alternatives, the industries will have
strong economic incentives to engage in research and development to
produce them. Moreover, as the regulatory net widens, and more
small businesses and individuals become subject to environmental regulation, a greater proliferation of schemes of transferable pollution
rights and environmental taxes will emerge. But schemes for transferable pollution rights depend upon good scientific information as to the
131 See

supra note 64-70 and accompanying text.
132See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
133 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(B), 9607(b)(3) (1988); see also S. Tasher, Environmental
Laws and Real Estate Handbook (1988).
134 CERCLA makes owners of property contaminated with hazardous waste liable for
cleanup costs regardless of traditional notions of culpability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); see
generally Debra L. Baker and Theodore G. Baroody, What Price Innocence? A Realistic View
of the Innocent Landowner Defense Under CERCLA, 22 St. Mary's L. J. 115 (1990).
135 See generally Tracy Cordes, Note, Who Gets the Bill?: Determining Insurers' Duty to
Defend and Indemnify Against Hazardous Waste Clean-Up Costs Under GeneralLiability Policies, 18 Envtl. L. 931 (1988) (discussing insurance company general liability policyholders
under CERCLA actions).
136See generally Adam Babich, Understandingthe New Era in EnvironmentalLaw, 41 S.C.
L. Rev. 733 (1990).
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proper overall ambient level of pollution and may fail because such
information is still too often absent. 37 Moreover, emissions trading
schemes should include provisions for periodically reducing overall
levels of pollution. Thus, they are unlikely to be employed in the area
of toxic pollutants because of the health risks associated with even
138
small emissions.
A fourth trend is environmental education, which is fundamental to
changes in behavior. After two decades of industry regulation, environmental problems, once thought to be mainly a product of large,
selfish corporate interests,1 39 are now believed to be largely a consequence of individual activities.' 40 To alter these activities, attitudes
towards the environment must change. This change in personal ethics costs much less than behavioral changes induced by government
regulation. Probably the best place to develop an environmental ethic
is in the primary schools where children can learn the golden rule of
common law nuisance actions: Use your property so as not to injure
others.' 41 The future can reap benefits from the education of today.
Further, there might be more immediate benefits, for we all know
children who are eager to instruct their parents.
The preceding trends are perceptible in 1992; they will almost certainly continue as we approach the 21st Century. What follows are
more personal hopes for the future of American environmental policy.
First, a rebirth in alternative energy and fuels which include solar,
wind, and fusion power should occur. Such a rebirth will require a
reinstitution of the federal subsidies tried briefly in the 1970s 42 but
abandoned in the 1980s.1 43 Federal subsidies are hard to come by in
an era of huge budget deficits, but continued reliance on hard energy
137 See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 Yale J.
on Reg. 89, 91-92 (1988).
138See Hahn & Hester, supra note 70, at 388-89; James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek,
Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful TransferableRights Programs, 6 Yale J. on
Reg. 369, 370 (1989) (discussing transferable rights programs generally).
139 See, e.g., Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (1971) (largely blaming industrial technology for environmental degradation).
140 See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 129, at 352-53.
141See, e.g., Chapman v. Barnett, 169 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ind. App. 1960).
142 For example, the National Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978),
established a variety of grant and loan programs to encourage conservation, and the Energy
Tax Act, Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978), gave tax credits for conservation and solar
energy. See Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 235,
253 (1989).
143 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., EnvironmentalPolicy - It is Time For a New Beginning, 14
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 111, 146 (1989); Joseph P. Tomain, Energy Policy Advice for the New
Administration, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 63, 67 (1989).
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paths-coal, oil and nuclear power-will almost surely have high
long-run costs.'"
Second, our reliance on oil could be reduced by doubling, or even
tripling, the fuel efficiency of automobile fleets. It is currently technically feasible to achieve fifty mile-per-gallon efficiencies, an achievement which would decrease world consumption of oil by more than a
quarter and would, in turn, reduce pressure to drill for new oil supplies in sensitive environmental areas like Alaska's Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge. 45 National security would also be increased by
reducing reliance on imported oil. However, because fuel efficiencies
will be achieved largely by reducing automobile weight, 4 6 automobile
47
manufacturers have cited safety concerns as an impediment.
Installation of devices such as air bags should minimize these
concerns.
My third hope for the future concerns the United States role in the
growing internationalization of environmental law. In 1987, the U.S.
played an important role in helping the international community
achieve an agreement to reduce reliance on air emissions that deplete
the stratospheric ozone layer.' 41 In 1990, this agreement was
strengthened, 49 again with active U.S. involvement.' However, the
U.S. record in international environmental agreements is a mixed one.
Longstanding opposition to the provisions of the United Nations Law
of the Sea CQnference regarding the mining of the deep sea bed led the
U.S. to abstain from signing that pathbreaking agreement.'
Furthermore, the U.S. seems unwilling to seriously consider proposals to
reduce or tax carbon emissions that contribute to global warming. 15 2
Certainly, greater scientific uncertainties surround, and fewer readily
available alternatives exist, to fuels now contributing to global warm144 An example of such costs was seen in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
145Reitze, supra note 143, at 143.
146 See Fuel Economy v. Safety, Nat'l J., May 11, 1991, at 1098.
147 Id.

148Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
149See Joel A. Mintz, Progress Toward a Healthy Sky: An Assessment of the London
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 Yale J.
Int'l L. 571, 578-81 (1991).
Io Id. at 578-81.
I51 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conference 62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (December 10, 1982).
152 See generally Laksham D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and

International Law, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 221 (1990) (arguing for U.S. leadership in international
agreements to reduce C02 emissions); Rudy Abramson, Talks on Global Warming Could Put

US. on Hot Seat, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, at AS; Diane Dumanoski, Study Challenges US.
Global Warming Policy, Boston Globe, Apr. 11, 1991, National/Foreign 1.
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ing than to the products depleting the stratospheric ozone. But few
doubt that global warming is, in fact, occurring, and that it is related
to carbon levels in the atmosphere. 53 I hope the U.S. will play a
constructive role in resolving any lingering scientific uncertainties.
We must move ahead to a constructive international agreement that
reduces emissions connected to global warming and anticipates and
resolves the problems associated with increases in global temperature.
The U.S. has played a constructive role in pioneering the concept of
debt-for-nature swaps with Third World countries, a program
whereby Third World countries preserve rain forests in return for forgiveness of their international debts.' 54 The U.S. government did not
involve itself directly with these swaps, however. Population control,
conversely, has received more direct governmental involvement. 5 5
Yet here the U.S. has played a pernicious role: discouraging the dissemination of information about birth control largely on the basis of a
domestic, political agenda unrelated to the global population
56
explosion.
United States environmental law has entered its third decade by
continuing to pioneer numerous concepts that may be worthy of emulation in other countries. I hope this brief introduction supplies
insights to those who wish to understand, emulate or affect U.S. environmental policy.

153See David Z. Kaufman, The Greenhouse Effect: Available and Needed Laws and Treaties, 9 U.C.L.A. J. Envtl. L. & Pub. Pol'y 219, 220 (1991).
154 See generally Robert M. Sadler, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future, 6 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 319 (1990) (discussing private conservation groups buying debt and
forgiving it in exchange for environmental concessions).
155 For a history and analysis of United States policy on international population control,
see Reuth Dixon-Meuller, U.S. InternationalPopulation Policy and "The Woman Question",
20 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 143 (1987).
156 See generally Rebecca J. Cook, US. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination, and Principles of Equality Under InternationalLaw, 20 N.Y.U. J. of Int'l L. and Pol'y 93, 94-95 (1988)
(discussing U.S. policy denying funding to foreign programs that fund abortions and the "illegality" of this program under international law); see also Rietze, supra note 143, at 121-28.
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